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retained by banks in their portfolios until they
matured or were paid off. Securitization is a
process by which mortgages (typically a large pool
of mortgages) are used as collateral to issue secu-
rities, also known as mortgage-backed securities
(MBS). Some mortgage securities are backed
implicitly or explicitly by the U.S. government
and are commonly called agency MBS. Such origi-
nation of mortgages and issuance of MBS is domi-
nated by loans to prime borrowers conforming to
underwriting standards set by the government-
sponsored agencies. Non-agency MBS issuance
can be split into three broad categories—jumbo,
Alt-A, and subprime. “Loosely speaking, the
Jumbo asset class includes loans to prime borrow-
ers with an original principal balance larger than
the conforming limits2 imposed on the agencies
H
igh default rates on subprime mort-
gages marked the onset of the current
financial crisis. Not surprisingly, both
academic research and policy studies
have focused their attention on the boom and sub-
sequent collapse of the subprime mortgage market.
However, the high incidence of defaults was not
limited to subprime mortgages only; defaults have
also risen rapidly in the other segments of the
mortgage market—for example, the market for
Alt-A (or Alternative-A) mortgages. But our
knowledge of the Alt-A market is significantly
less than our knowledge of subprime mortgages.
This paper aims to fill this void. This study
presents a brief overview of Alt-A mortgage orig-
inations with the goal of outlining broad trends in
the different borrower and mortgage characteristics
of Alt-A originations between 2000 and 2006. The
paper also documents the default patterns of Alt-A
mortgages in terms of the various borrower and
mortgage characteristics over this period. We begin
with a broad overview of the different segments
of the overall U.S. mortgage market and their evo-
lution over this period, with a special emphasis
on the Alt-A mortgage segment.1
Since the 1970s, the principal structural
change in the mortgage market has been the use
of securitization. Prior to this, mortgages were
1 See Lehnert (2009) and Quigley (2006) for a more detailed overview.
2 Conforming mortgages satisfy balance limits and are typically
securitized either with some form of explicit government guaran-
tees (Federal Housing Administration/Veterans Administration
[FHA/VA] mortgages securitized by the Government National
Mortgage Association [Ginnie Mae]) or with implicit government
guarantees (conventional mortgages securitized by the Federal
National Mortgage Association [Fannie Mae] and Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation [Freddie Mac]). In contrast, the private-
label market securitizes nonconforming mortgages, which include
the jumbo prime, subprime, and Alt-A markets (for more details,
see Fabozzi, 2006).
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to borrowers with good credit but includes more
aggressive underwriting than the conforming or
Jumbo classes (i.e., no documentation of income,
high leverage); and the Subprime asset class
involves loans to borrowers with poor credit his-
tory.”3 Both agency and non-agency jumbo mort-
gages constitute the prime mortgage market of
high-credit-quality borrowers, while the non-prime
segment comprises subprime and Alt-A mortgages.
At the outset, it is important to mention that
the guidelines for selecting mortgages into sub-
prime and Alt-A pools vary by arranger of the
MBS. Typically, Alt-A mortgages are underwritten
to borrowers of good credit quality—that is, those
who would otherwise qualify for a prime loan in
terms of their credit history. However, Alt-A bor-
rowers do not satisfy the underwriting rules for
prime loans because they are unwilling or unable
to provide full documentation on their mortgage
application.4 Their inability to provide this infor-
mation is largely due to the fact that such borrow-
ers are in professions characterized by variable
incomes or are self-employed borrowers operating
cash businesses. On the other hand, subprime
originations are primarily to borrowers with
incomplete or impaired credit histories. Therefore,
while the criterion for selection into a particular
pool is not consistent across lenders, the credit
quality for Alt-A pools is characteristically better
than that for subprime pools. 
Historically, the Alt-A market has been the
preserve of highly specialized lenders with
expertise in underwriting such loans. Over the
years, this market has grown significantly and
evolved with an increased level of investor spon-
sorship. Figure 1 shows the evolution of mortgage
originations by market segment in the United
States between 2001 and 2006.5 A significant
decline in prime mortgage interest rates between
2000 and 2003 aided a refinance boom and the
increase in agency mortgages was a major factor
behind the growth in total mortgage originations
over this period (see Figure 1). However, with
the rise in mortgage interest rates, prime origina-
tions declined sharply after 2003. Meanwhile,
the growth of non-prime originations continued
unabated. The growth rates in annual originations
for the agency, subprime, and Alt-A segments from
2001 through 2003 were 95 percent, 94 percent,
and 54 percent, respectively, but annual agency
originations declined by 60 percent from 2003 to
2006. In contrast, the comparable growth rates
between 2003 and 2006 for the subprime and
Alt-A segments were 94 and 340 percent, respec-
tively. The higher levels of originations after 2003
were largely sustained by the growth of the non-
prime (both the subprime and Alt-A) segment of
the mortgage market.
This paper uses the loan-level data on secu-
ritized Alt-A originations from 1998 through 2007
published by LoanPerformance (LP).6 The data
contain details on individual securitized Alt-A
loans, and a loan is classified as subprime or Alt-
A depending on whether it is securitized in a sub-
prime or Alt-A pool.7 The details include mortgage
attributes of the loan, such as the product type,
the interest rate, the loan purpose (purchase or
refinance), documentation (full-doc or low-doc),
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and borrower charac-
teristics such as credit scores (FICO8 at the time
of origination). The next section outlines the
broad trends in the underwriting standards for
Alt-A mortgages in terms of these attributes. We
then outline the performance of Alt-A loans in
terms of the borrower and mortgage characteristics
mentioned previously.
Sengupta
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3 Ashcraft and Schuermann (2008).
4 Generally this documentation is regarding their income. In limited
or no-documentation programs, applicants typically state their
income and assets to the loan officer but are not required to show
detailed proof of that information for the lender’s files. They are
often termed stated income mortgages.
5 This figure is updated from Sengupta and Tam (2008).
6 For details on the coverage of the LP data and the relation to other
available mortgage databases, see Mayer and Pence (2008). Accord  -
ing to Mayer and Pence (2008), LP captures “around 90 percent of
the subprime securitized market from 1999 to 2002 and nearly all
the market from 2003 to 2005.”
7 As mentioned earlier, different arrangers use different criteria for
this selection. Therefore, it is possible that what is considered to
be subprime by a particular arranger may be classified as Alt-A by
a different arranger.
8 Borrower credit score at the time of loan origination is denoted by
FICO (an industry standard developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation)
with a number in the range 300 to 850. The score increases with
the creditworthiness of the borrower.SUMMARY: TRENDS FOR ALT-A
MORTGAGES
We begin this section by studying the charac-
teristics of Alt-A mortgages originated between
1998 through 2007. The shares of product types
originated in the Alt-A markets by vintage (year
of origination) are given in Table 1. Table 1 shows
that before 2004, the majority of Alt-A mortgages
were fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). Interestingly,
the share of FRMs as a proportion of total origi-
nations fell by half in a single year, from 2003 to
2004. This decline was accompanied by a rise in
the fraction of loans that were adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs).
Table 1 also shows the growth of hybrid-ARM
products over this period.9 We define ARMq as
the hybrid-ARM where the first reset occurs after
q years. Typically, the mortgage rate on an ARM
loan resets once every 6 months or a year into an
indexed rate (like the 6-month LIBOR) plus a
margin. Therefore the ARM1 is just the standard
ARM product that resets after the first year, while
the ARM2, ARM3, and ARM5 categories include
the more specialized products, such as the 2/28,
the 3/27, and the 5/25 mortgage products,
respectively.10
Table 2 presents a similar table for subprime
mortgages. The data show a gradual rise in ARM2
and ARM3 products in the subprime market from
around 30 percent of the market in 1998 to more
than 70 percent of the market between 2004 and
2006. However, with the exception of 2004-05,
ARM2 and ARM3 products were never more than
10 percent of the Alt-A market. Among hybrid-
ARM Alt-A originations, the ARM5 product has
the largest share of the market, growing from less
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Origination and Issue of Mortgage Loans by Market Segment
NOTE: The figure shows the evolution of mortgage originations by market segment in the United States between 2001 and 2007.
SOURCE: Insider Mortgage Finance Publications, Inc.
9 Hybrid-ARM products are specialized products that include an
initial period over which the repayment schedule on the mortgage
resembles that of an FRM and a subsequent period over which the
mortgage product acts like an ARM. During the fixed-leg of the
hybrid-ARM, the mortgagee pays a lower introductory closing rate
called the teaser rate. The teaser rate remains in effect until the
reset date, after which the repayment schedule on the hybrid-ARM
resembles an ARM. The reset date, market index rate used, and
the margin are decided at the closing date.
10 Therefore, the 2/28 and the 3/27 products are 30-year mortgages
with teaser rates for two and three years, respectively. The rationale
for adopting the ARMq terminology over the traditional 2/28 or
3/27 is that this terminology is inclusive of mortgage products that
have amortization terms of more than 30 years. Sengupta
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Table 2
Evolution of Subprime Securitized Mortgages (Percent Market Share by Product Type)
Mortgage type
Vintage FRM ARM1 ARM2 ARM3 ARM5 Other Share of total
1998 51.33 8.20 26.53 4.52 0.25 9.17 2.6
1999 38.88 2.26 29.34 19.21 0.50 9.81 3.8
2000 32.58 1.20 43.29 14.78 0.56 7.59 4.1
2001 31.70 0.51 48.69 12.44 0.54 6.13 5.1
2002 28.37 0.60 54.84 12.62 1.16 2.42 7.7
2003 33.57 0.45 52.60 11.37 1.20 0.81 12.9
2004 23.81 0.35 59.73 14.64 1.30 0.17 19.5
2005 18.66 0.54 65.48 13.22 1.57 0.53 23.0
2006 19.98 0.82 62.56 10.86 1.35 3.44 18.1
2007 27.59 0.45 50.23 9.92 5.87 5.94 3.4
Share of total 25.7 0.8 56.7 12.7 1.6 2.5 100
NOTE: The table shows the share (percentage) of subprime product types by vintage (year of origination). FRM, fixed-rate mortgages;
ARMq mortgages are defined as the hybrid-ARM where the first reset occurs after q years. Remaining mortgage types are classified
as Other.
Table 1
Evolution of Alt-A Securitized Mortgages (Percent Market Share by Product Type)
Mortgage type
Vintage FRM ARM1 ARM2 ARM3 ARM5 Other Share of total
1998 98.97 0.41 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.41 2.7
1999 93.27 1.50 2.64 0.79 0.94 0.87 1.7
2000 85.04 9.15 1.13 0.94 1.88 1.87 1.5
2001 79.36 6.20 5.09 1.50 5.34 2.52 2.6
2002 75.52 9.98 3.68 1.86 7.33 1.64 4.4
2003 71.21 5.88 4.92 4.38 12.90 0.70 8.3
2004 35.72 21.70 8.03 14.07 20.37 0.11 17.4
2005 38.52 31.57 5.24 6.37 18.24 0.05 27.5
2006 37.01 34.40 1.77 3.05 22.90 0.87 25.5
2007 41.56 22.51 0.18 0.91 33.90 0.94 8.4
Share of total 46.5 24.4 4.1 5.6 18.8 0.6 100
NOTE: The table shows the share (percentage) of Alt-A product types by vintage (year of origination). FRM, fixed-rate mortgages;
ARMq mortgages are defined as the hybrid-ARM where the first reset occurs after q years. Remaining mortgage types are classified
as Other.than 1 percent of the total in 1998-99 to 33 percent
of the total by 2007. Further research is needed to
determine the causes behind the sudden switch
from FRMs to ARMs after 2003 and the increase in
share of hybrid ARMs in the 2004 and 2005 vin-
tages. This paper presents data on only Alt-A mort-
gages, which are then compared with the trends
in subprime originations over the same period.11
It is important to point out that most hybrid-
ARM Alt-A originations are ARM5 products that
originated after 2003. Therefore, most reset dates
for surviving mortgages in this pool have not yet
arrived at the time of this writing. In contrast, the
majority of subprime hybrid-ARM originations
were ARM2 and ARM3 products, which are cur-
rently past their reset dates. Therefore, unless
these products are refinanced earlier, rate resets
can adversely affect repayment behavior and
increase future delinquency rates on surviving
Alt-A originations.
Figure 2 shows the monthly trends in share
of Alt-A originations by purpose (purchase or
refinance). Purchases make the largest category of
Alt-A originations, but their proportion fluctuates
over the months in our sample period. At their
peak in June 2000, purchases accounted for 74 per-
cent of Alt-A originations. However, their fraction
drops to 34 percent in February 2003. This move-
ment might be explained by the refinancing behav-
ior of households. From 2000 to 2004, the Federal
Reserve adopted an expansionary monetary policy.
To the extent this translated to lower mortgage
rates on Alt-A products, households would choose
to refinance existing mortgages for lower rates.12
While fluctuations in the proportion of no-
cash-out refinances and purchases might be
explained in terms of mortgage rates, this pattern
does not hold for cash-out refinances. Perhaps the
Sengupta
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11 Data on the summary trends on subprime mortgages are not 
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Figure 2
Percentage Share by Total Alt-A Origination by Purpose
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A originations by purpose in percentages between 1998 and 2007.
12 Indeed, prime mortgage rates fell from 8.29 percent in June 2000
to 5.84 percent in March 2004. Individual mortgage rates on Alt-A
loans are tailored to specific borrower and loan attributes. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no known universal contract rate
for Alt-A mortgages.more remarkable trend in Figure 2 is an increase
in the share of cash-out refinances since 2000.
A similar pattern is observed for subprime mort-
gages as well. In short, the growth in non-prime
mortgages after 2000 has been fueled largely by
households seeking to extract home equity during
a period of appreciating home prices. With the
decline in home prices and the onset of the mort-
gage crisis, the Fed lowered rates after the second
quarter of 2007. At the same time, the share of both
cash-out refinances and purchases fell sharply,
while that for no-cash-out refinances increased.
In terms of occupancy, most Alt-A originations
were for owner-occupied properties as shown in
Figure 3. The share of owner-occupied housing
increased from a little over 60 percent at the begin-
ning of our sample period to more than 80 percent
toward the end of the sample period. During the
same time, the share of Alt-A second-home origi-
nations fell by half: from nearly 35 percent in 1998
to around 17 percent by the end of 2006. The frac-
tion of non–owner-occupied housing has been
small throughout the sample period. The broad
pattern of shares in each occupancy category has
been similar to that for subprime mortgages. For
example, owner-occupied houses have accounted
for the significant majority (more than 90 percent)
of subprime originations for most of our sample
period. Consequently, the share of second homes
in the subprime category has been much smaller
than that for Alt-A.
Figure 4 shows a sharp increase in the share
of low-doc loans in post-2004 Alt-A originations.
Barring a few exceptions, the share of low-doc
originations has always ranged between 50 and
60 percent of originations until 2004. To the casual
observer this figure may seem very high. But this
is precisely the rationale behind the creation of
the Alt-A market: borrowers of good credit quality
unwilling or unable to provide full documenta-
tion for a prime loan. In any case, the share of low-
doc loans rose from 52 percent in April 2004 to
78 percent by the end of 2006. A similar trend
toward low-doc originations was witnessed for
Sengupta


















Percentage Share by Total Alt-A Origination by Occupancy
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A originations by occupancy in percentages between 1998 and 2007.subprime originations, although the increase
there was moderate and gradual compared with
that of Alt-A. It is unclear what prompted this
sharp increase in low-doc originations in the non-
prime market segment. More recently, the share
of low-doc mortgages dropped sharply from its
peak of 78 percent at the beginning of 2007 to 50
percent at the end of 2007.
An important measure of underwriting is the
credit quality on the originations as represented
by the credit (FICO) scores of borrowers at the
time of origination. The majority of borrowers
who originate Alt-A mortgages have FICO scores
in excess of 680 (Figure 5). This is a major distin-
guishing characteristic between the subprime and
Alt-A mortgage pools. The average credit quality
of Alt-A pools is significantly higher than that for
subprime pools. It needs to be mentioned here
that this is not the only distinguishing character-
istic; it is often possible to identify a mortgage
that belongs to the subprime pool but has a FICO
score above 700. The reason a mortgage with a
high FICO score could be characterized as sub-
prime (and not Alt-A) is possibly because the
mortgage fails to qualify as Alt-A (or even prime)
on one or more criteria other than credit score
such as documentation, lien type, and LTV ratio.13
Figure 5 shows that, for the most part, the
shares of originations with FICO scores in the
621-680 range and the 740 or higher range have
been similar. The share of originations with FICO
scores above 740 fell for a period between October
1998 and December 1999; this was accompanied
by a rise in the share of originations in the 621-680
range. More recently, the onset of defaults in non-
prime mortgages tightened lending standards in
this market, leading to a sharp increase in the
percentage of originations with FICO scores in
excess of 740 from around 26 percent in December
2006 to 54 percent in November 2007. To sum up,
Figure 5 shows that, except for the two periods
mentioned above, the share of originations across
Sengupta
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13 The choice of a non-prime mortgage between Alt-A and subprime

















Percentage Share by Total Alt-A Origination by Documentation
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A originations by documentation in percentages between 1998 and 2007.the various FICO score categories are fairly stable
over the years in our sample period.
At this point, it is important to highlight the
difference between the originations of subprime
and Alt-A loans between 2000 and 2007 with
regard to documentation and credit scores. In both
cases, the share of low-doc loans increased over
the years, as shown in Figure 6. However, in the
case of the subprime market, there is evidence
that average credit scores on originations with
lower documentation increased. This is shown
in Figure 6B as the decline in the proportion of
low-doc originations with FICO scores less than
620. This feature of underwriting suggests that
lenders’ emphasis on FICO score was not only
an adequate indicator of credit risk, but also a
means to adjust for other riskier attributes on the
origination. On the other hand, there does not
appear to be such a trend toward higher FICO
scores for loans with low documentation in the
case of the Alt-A mortgage market. The proportion
of low-doc loans with FICO scores less than 680
remains roughly the same over the years in our
sample period (Figure 6A).14 This pattern seems
to point to secular deterioration in the underwrit-
ing for Alt-A mortgages, unlike that observed for
subprime originations.
A final measure of underwriting on Alt-A
originations in our dataset is the LTV ratio on
the mortgage (Figure 7).15 The majority of Alt-A
originations have LTV ratios that are less than 80
percent, and it is important to note that the LTV
threshold of 80 percent is one of the requirements
on prime mortgages. Figure 7 shows that the share
of originations with LTVs less than or equal to 80
percent has declined over the years in our sample
period. This is accompanied by an increase in the
14 The FICO scores chosen are higher for Alt-A because on average
Alt-A credit scores are higher than subprime. The weighted average
of FICO scores for the Alt-A market is presumably higher, but we
have chosen our cutoff conservatively. 
15 The LTV ratio is calculated as the closing balance/value of the
property, and where available we have used the cumulative loan-
to-value (CLTV) ratio because it provides a better measure of the
home equity of the borrower. The CLTV ratio is the proportion of
loans (secured by the property) on all liens in relation to the
property’s value.
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Percentage Share by Total Alt-A Origination by Credit Quality (FICO Score)
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A originations by credit quality in percentages between 1998 and 2007.Sengupta
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Evidence on Underwriting: Documentation and FICO Score
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A (subprime) originations with low documentation, and among those, with
FICO scores less than 680 (620) in percentages between 2000 and 2007.share of Alt-A originations with LTV in the (90,
100] range. The share in this category increased
from a low of 2 percent of total originations from
the beginning of our sample period to about 32
percent by the end of 2006. Meanwhile, the share
of originations with LTV in the intermediate range
of (80, 90] has remained fairly stable except for a
period between 1999 and 2001 when this share
increased.
In summary, Alt-A mortgages are typically
originated to borrowers of moderate to high credit
quality with a lack of willingness or ability to pro-
vide documentation in support of their loan appli-
cation. First, most Alt-A originations have FICO
scores above 680. At the same time, the share of
low-doc originations in this market has almost
never been below 50 percent. While this has been
the principal characteristic of Alt-A loans, the
market witnessed a significant relaxing of credit
standards both in terms of a greater share of low-
documentation loans and high-LTV originations
between 2000 and 2006. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the share of borrowers using Alt-A prod-
ucts to extract equity in their homes has almost
doubled between 2000 and 2006. In the next sec-
tion, we study the performance of these mortgages
in terms of the attributes on the originations.
Loan Performance of Alt-A Mortgages
The LP data allow for tracking repayment
behavior on mortgages on a monthly basis. There  -
fore, we can determine the nature (30-day, 60-day,
90-day, or foreclosure) and timing (month) of the
delinquency event. Following industry conven-
tions, we define a mortgage to be in default (or in
serious delinquency) if it records a 90-day delin-
quency event at any point in its repayment his-
tory.16 The nonparametric default probabilities
presented in this paper are calculated using the
Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator (see the
appendix for details on this methodology). 
16 Although we use 90-day delinquencies throughout the paper, the
results for 60-day delinquencies and foreclosures are qualitatively
similar and are available on request.
Sengupta











1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
CLTV
100  CLTV  90 




Percentage Share by Total Alt-A Origination by LTV Ratios
NOTE: The figure shows the monthly trends of share Alt-A originations by loan-to-value ratios in percentages between 1998 and 2007.Figure 8 presents the overall performance of
Alt-A mortgages by showing estimated default
probabilities for each vintage (year of origination)
by age of the loan. The broad trends in Figure 8
show that defaults started to rise sharply in 2006
and 2007, primarily for originations after 2003.
To give an example, about 10 percent of mortgages
originated in 2001 were in serious delinquency
after the third calendar year (at the beginning of
2003), whereas the same proportion of defaults
for 2006 originations occurred after the first one-
and-a-half calendar years (middle of calendar
year 2007).17
The rise in sharp defaults for later vintages is
best viewed by comparing the default rates on
originations of 2003 and 2004 vintages with that
of originations of 2005 and 2006 vintages. Table 3
shows the default rates on originations of 2003 and
2004 vintages at the end of the second calendar
year were 2.03 percent and 2.47 percent, respec-
tively. In contrast, originations of 2006 vintage
had a default rate of 16.36 percent by the end of
the second calendar year. To summarize, defaults
rise sharply around 2006 and this is largely con-
centrated on originations after 2003. Perhaps the
most striking feature of this trend is that a signif-
icant proportion of the mortgages defaulted very
early. This is also true for subprime mortgages,
and the literature on subprime has focused on
explaining such high early defaults.
An interesting piece of anecdotal evidence is
revealed in the significantly lower default rates on
2003 vintages. Indeed, 2003 is the best-performing
vintage for Alt-A mortgages and this is true for
subprime mortgages as well. For subprime origi-
nations, the anomalous behavior for originations
Sengupta
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17 The year of origination is counted as the first year of evaluation of
loan performance. In the interest of clarity, the performance plots





















Default Rate on Alt-A Originations by Vintage
NOTE: The plot shows the Kaplan-Meier default probabilities by loan age for securitized Alt-A mortgages. The graph presents the
default probabilities by years of origination (vintage). Each line shows the performance of originations of the same vintage.Sengupta
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Table 3
Performance of 2003-2006 Alt-A Vintages for the First Three Calendar Years
Default rate (%) per year of origination
Calendar date 2003 2004 2005 2006
End of 2003 0.64 ———
End of 2004 2.03 0.63 ——
End of 2005 3.55 2.45 0.97 —
End of 2006 — 4.86 4.67 2.66
End of 2007 —— 13.84 16.36
End of 2008 ——— 36.60
The table shows the default rates on Alt-A mortgages originated between 2003 and 2006 at the end of the first three calendar years.
Table 4
90-Day Delinquent Alt-A Mortgages (Percent by Attributes on Origination)
Product type Purpose Occupancy
Refinance  Refinance  Second  Non-owner 
All FRM ARM ARM5 Purchase (cash-out) (no cash-out) Owner home (investor)
A. Percent delinquent after first 18 calendar months
2000 3.1 3.5 0.4 0.7 3.3 2.6 3.1 3.3 1.5 2.6
2001 3.1 3.1 2.7 1.2 3.9 2.3 2.0 3.0 1.8 3.9
2002 2.7 2.7 2.4 1.5 3.4 2.2 1.5 2.8 2.1 2.2
2003 1.3 1.2 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.7
2004 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.3
2005 2.4 1.9 2.8 3.2 2.9 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.8 2.6
2006 7.9 5.6 9.3 12.9 9.5 5.3 9.0 8.0 6.7 7.8
2007 13.1 8.4 16.6 18.8 16.6 8.9 14.1 13.3 13.9 11.8
B. Percent delinquent after two calendar years
2000 5.0 5.5 1.1 2.2 5.1 4.1 5.1 4.8 2.7 4.4
2001 5.1 5.2 4.3 2.3 6.3 3.9 3.5 4.7 3.1 5.9
2002 4.3 4.5 3.4 2.3 5.4 3.7 2.6 4.3 3.2 3.5
2003 2.0 1.8 2.5 1.5 2.9 1.7 1.1 2.3 1.4 1.2
2004 2.4 2.3 2.6 1.8 2.7 2.1 2.3 2.4 1.5 2.2
2005 4.7 3.3 5.7 5.9 5.5 3.5 4.3 4.2 3.8 4.9
2006 16.4 10.7 19.9 24.2 18.5 12.4 18.8 15.0 14.8 15.6
2007 24.0 15.7 30.3 33.0 28.6 18.2 26.0 22.4 24.0 22.0
The table shows the percentage of originations of a given vintage that are in default within a given time period across various attributes
on the origination, including product types, purpose, and occupancy.of 2003 vintage has been explained in terms of the
high prepayment rates on subprime mortgages.
As many as 83 percent of surviving subprime
hybrid-ARMs that were originated in 2003 were
prepaid by the end of 2007 (see Bhardwaj and
Sengupta, 2009b). This is not surprising for sub-
prime mortgages, given that prepayment is an inte-
gral part of the mortgage design for hybrid-ARM
products (see Gorton, 2008, for details). However,
hybrid-ARMs are not a significantly large part of
the Alt-A pool. Therefore, it would be interesting
to explore whether the low default rates on 2003
Alt-A products were also driven by high prepay-
ments. In what follows, we show that this broad
trend of a significant increase in the default rates
on post-2004 originations can be seen across var-
ious mortgage attributes such as product type,
purpose, occupancy, and documentation. These
trends show a high degree of correlation between
default rates and some origination attributes. Of
course, the standard caveat applies to interpreting
these correlations as causation.
Tables 4 and 5 show the percentage of origina-
tions of a given vintage that are in default within
a given time period, by various attributes of the
origination. Panel A presents the default rates for
the first 18 calendar months since the year of
origination, whereas Panel B reports the same for
the first two years since the year of origination.
These choices of time periods are driven by two
reasons. First, we have only the first two years
of data for every origination vintage from 2000
through 2007, allowing for a comparison across
all vintages. Second, as demonstrated earlier, the
crisis in the mortgage markets was characterized
by high early defaults. 
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Table 5
90-day Delinquent Alt-A Mortgages (Percent by Attributes on Origination)
Documentation Credit score CLTV ratio
All Full Low 621-680 681-740 740+ <70 [70, 80) (80,90] (90,100]
A. Percent delinquent after first 18 calendar months
2000 3.1 2.4 3.6 5.1 2.1 1.2 1.3 2.5 5.1 4.2
2001 3.1 1.9 3.9 5.5 2.0 1.1 1.3 2.4 5.5 5.2
2002 2.7 1.9 3.3 4.9 1.8 0.8 0.9 2.2 4.4 5.1
2003 1.3 0.9 1.6 2.8 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.9 2.3 3.1
2004 1.5 1.1 1.7 2.7 1.2 0.5 0.5 1.0 2.2 2.7
2005 2.4 1.6 2.8 4.3 2.2 0.9 0.7 1.5 2.8 4.8
2006 7.9 3.6 9.1 12.1 7.8 3.4 1.7 4.8 9.5 14.1
2007 13.1 5.8 14.9 19.3 14.0 6.4 3.0 9.3 18.1 23.6
B. Percent delinquent after two calendar years
2000 5.0 4.1 5.5 7.8 3.6 2.0 2.2 4.1 7.9 6.4
2001 5.1 3.4 6.3 8.7 3.5 1.8 2.2 4.0 8.5 8.7
2002 4.3 3.3 5.1 8.0 3.0 1.2 1.5 3.6 6.9 8.1
2003 2.0 1.5 2.3 4.3 1.5 0.6 0.6 1.5 3.6 4.6
2004 2.4 1.9 2.8 4.5 2.0 0.9 1.0 1.7 3.6 4.2
2005 4.7 2.9 5.5 8.2 4.4 1.8 1.4 3.1 6.1 8.7
2006 16.4 7.7 18.7 23.6 16.5 7.7 4.2 11.5 21.7 25.4
2007 24.0 11.5 27.0 34.2 25.6 12.3 7.1 19.2 33.3 37.9
The table shows the percentage of originations of a given vintage that are in default within a given time period across various attributes
on the origination, including documentation, credit score, and CLTV ratio.For most years in our sample period, ARMs
have registered higher default rates than FRMs,
but the difference was much greater for origina-
tions between 2005 and 2007 (columns 3 through
5 in Table 4). For 2003, however, the performance
of ARMs is similar to that of FRMs. The lower
default rates on ARMs for earlier vintages might
be explained by the low interest rate environment
during the early part of this decade. However, as
the Federal Reserve tightened monetary policy
after the second half of 2004, the burden of interest
payments on ARMs would have increased signifi-
cantly. Also, the share of ARMs in total origina-
tions for earlier vintages was low compared with
the share for later vintages. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult to interpret the default patterns as being reflec-
tive of the risk underlying each product type.
Evidently, the default rates on ARM5 products18
are even higher than those on ARM products over-
all. This is interesting, given that the loan maturity
period under consideration is well before the
reset dates on the ARM5 products. These results
seem to suggest that the defaults on Alt-A prod-
ucts have little to do with interest rate resets on
hybrid-ARM products.
Next, we study the default patterns by purpose
of origination (columns 6 through 8 in Table 4).
Purchase originations show significantly higher
rates of default over the years in our sample
period. This may be attributed to greater adverse
selection problems for first-time buyers than for
refinances, where the borrower is likely to have
had a recorded history of mortgage payments, pre-
sumably with the same lender. Here, too, default
rates rise significantly for originations after 2005. 
Under occupancy, we find that non–owner-
occupied homes have the highest default rates,
followed by second homes, while owner-occupied
homes have the lowest default rates (columns 9
through 11 in Table 4). Anecdotal evidence often
points to the role of investors using non-prime
mortgage products to speculate on residential
property after 2004. This has been claimed as a
proximate cause of the mortgage crisis in the
United States. Of course, this would also explain
the deterioration of lending standards and the
high early default rates on originations after 2004.
However, the summary data presented above
show little evidence in support of this hypothesis.
The proportion of second homes had been declin-
ing over the sample period. Moreover, non–owner-
occupied properties were a small fraction of the
loans throughout the sample period. 
Not surprisingly, low-doc originations show
a higher rate of default than full-doc loans
(columns 3 and 4 in Table 5). Given the higher
default rates on such loans, even for the earlier
vintages, it is surprising to see the increasing
share of Alt-A originations after 2004 that do not
provide full documentation. To most observers
this would bring into question the wisdom of
originators who increased the proportion of low-
doc loans in their mortgage pools. However, as
noted previously, Alt-A mortgages are originated
in an effort to capture borrowers who have good
credit but are otherwise unable to provide docu-
mentation on their loans. Moreover, it is difficult
to interpret the lack of documentation on loans as
the principal cause behind the high default rates
in the Alt-A market. For example, more than half
of the originations in 2003 were loans without
full documentation. However, the difference in
the default rates on full-doc and low-doc loans
for this vintage was less than 1 percentage point
even after three calendar years.19
Next, we turn our attention to default rates in
terms of credit quality as measured by borrower
FICO at the time of origination (columns 5 through
7 in Table 5). A number of observers have pointed
to higher default rates on a given FICO score as
an indication of the poor performance of FICO.
However, one needs to approach this argument
with caution. For instance, if some exogenous
factor were driving defaults in the mortgage mar-
ket, one is likely to see poor performance for the
said vintages across all FICO score groups. This
is precisely what we observe in the data. A more
relevant test of the effectiveness of FICO would
18 The choice of ARM5 is motivated by the fact that, among Alt-A
originations with hybrid products, the ARM5 product has the
largest market share.
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19 Among originations of 2003 vintage, the default rate after three
calendar years on full-doc loans was 2.82 percent, whereas the
default rate on low-doc loans was 3.79 percent. The comparable
figures for originations of 2006 vintage were 19.03 and 39.18 per-
cent, respectively.be a comparison across the different FICO score
groups for a given vintage. The three panels show
the performance of Alt-A by FICO score groups of
621-680, 681-740, and higher than 740.20 Within
each FICO score group, the later vintages (post-
2004 originations) show higher default rates. More
importantly, across the various score groups, the
default rates for the same vintage are higher as one
moves from a higher FICO score group to a lower
FICO group.
Lastly, we study the effect of LTV on the sum-
mary measures of default (columns 8 through 11
in Table 5). Default probabilities increase when
one moves from originations with lower LTV ratios
to those with higher LTV ratios. Note that the loan
performance for the 80 to 90 percent and the 90
to 100 percent LTV ratio categories are somewhat
similar, especially for the early vintages.21 How  -
ever, the gap in the default rates widens on later
vintages.
In summary, Tables 4 and 5 confirm our a
priori knowledge on underwriting. First, riskier
attributes such as lower documentation, lower
FICO scores, and higher LTV ratios perform poorly.
Second, the differences in default probabilities
between a more-risky attribute and that of a less-
risky attribute increase for originations after 2004.
Third, there is no monotonic trend over the years
in the default rates across these attributes, how-
ever. Default rates have typically fallen for 2003
and 2004 originations, but risen sharply for later
vintages. Finally, even for the later vintages, the
defaults have risen across all attributes, irrespec-
tive of ex ante risk on the attribute. These summary
results emphasize that one must exert caution
when interpreting the riskier attributes on the
origination as proximate causes of high early
defaults on Alt-A mortgages in 2006 and 2007.
CONCLUSION
This paper provides a preliminary overview
of Alt-A mortgages that were originated in the
United States from 1998 through 2007. First, the
summary data indicate a shift of Alt-A origina-
tions toward a greater share of owner-occupied
properties, adjustable-rate products, and cash-out
refinances. This is accompanied by a deterioration
of underwriting standards for a greater propor-
tion of mortgages with lower documentation and
higher loan-to-value ratios. Serious delinquencies
on Alt-A originations rose sharply in 2006 and
2007, primarily for originations after 2003. Even
for originations of a later vintage, the defaults have
risen across all attributes, irrespective of ex ante
risk on the attribute.
A final comment addresses the following
question: How does one reconcile the secular
deterioration of underwriting for Alt-A mortgages
with the lack of this evidence in the case of sub-
prime mortgages (see Bhardwaj and Sengupta,
2009a)? In their handbook chapter on Alt-A mort-
gages, Bhattacharya, Berliner, and Liber (2006,
p. 189) remark that “the demarcation between
Alt-A and subprime loans has been blurred. Over
time Alt-A has expanded to include loans with
progressively less documentation and lower bor-
rower credit scores. At the same time, subprime
loans have, on average experienced a slow but
steady rise in average credit scores. A result of
this convergence has been the creation of the
so-called Alt-B sector, where loans using this
nomenclature were securitized in 2004.”
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20 We do not report default rates for the FICO score group less than
620, as their share throughout has been small and declining. In
fact, fewer than 1 percent of post-2004 originations in the Alt-A
market have FICO scores less than 620.
21 Again, since they form a small share of the total market, the plots
for Alt-A originations with LTV in excess of 100 are not reported
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Default rates and the probability of surviving a delinquency are calculated by using the Kaplan and
Meier (1958) product limit estimator. We begin this nonparametric approach to survival and hazard
function estimation by formalizing it in the current context of mortgage repayment behavior.
Following Kaplan and Meier (1958), the delinquency rate Dt at month t (the age of the mortgage
in months) is defined as
where T is the age in months for the delinquency event (60-day, 90-day, or foreclosure) of a randomly
selected mortgage and StPT > t is the survivor function or the probability of surviving the delin-
quency event beyond age t. Let t1 < t2 < … < tk represent the ordered age in months at the time of the
delinquency event. For all these months, let ni be the number of surviving mortgages just prior to
month ti. Surviving mortgages exclude not only the ones that have been delinquent, but also the ones
that have been refinanced prior to age ti. If dt is the number of mortgages that become delinquent at
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